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COMMENTS
AIRPORTS-AUTHORITY OF CITY TO ENFORCE FLYING REGULATION BEYOND
ITS CORPORATE LIMITS.-[Tenn.] The city of Chattanooga owns and oper-
ates a municipal airport on land acquired for that purpose located something
more than two miles beyond its corporate limits. By Chapter 2 of the
Private Acts of 1929, the city was expressly authorized to acquire, establish,
and operate an airport, either within, or without, its corporate limits. The
city Charter also provides: "The Board of Commissioners shall have power
by ordinance within the city to provide for enclosing, improving and regu-
lating all public grounds belonging to the city in or out of the corporate
limits." Silverman operated his airplane at and over this airport in viola-
tion of an ordinance regulating the operation of aircraft, and appealed from
a judgment against him on the ground that the city was without power to
punish for this violation of its ordinance, because it was without jurisdiction
of this territory lying beyond the charter limits of the city, even though
owned and operated as an. airport by the municipality. Held, the city char-
ter expressly conferring upon the city the power by ordinance of "regu-
lating all public grounds belonging to the city, in or out of the corporate
limits," embraces the power to enforce a violation of these regulations in
ordinance form. Silverman v. City of Chattanooga, 57 S. W. (2d) 554
(Tennessee).
A municipal airport is necessarily governed by municipal corporation
law in its establishment, acquisition, and operation. As such it is well
settled that a municipal corporation possesses and can exercise only such
powers as are granted in express terms, those necessarily implied or in-
cident to the powers expressly granted, and those essential to the declared
objects and purposes of the corporation., So, the authority of municipal
corporations to exercise powers beyond their territorial limits must be de-
rived from some statute expressly, or by necessary implication.2
Ex necessitate, a limited police power may be granted to municipalities
over a small section of country surrounding their boundaries for their
protection against nuisances and to safeguard the health of the people re-
siding in them. It is significant, however, that while the extraterritorial
effect of a city ordinance depends upon legislative authority conferred, yet
the language of the charter here expressly conferred the power exercised.
The result is further fortified by two subsequent statutes apparently not
appearing or relied upon anywhere in the opinion in the instant case. It
is conjectural, therefore, whether either were invoked. Thus, municipalities
operating airports without their geographical limits were specifically granted
1. Ogden v. Madison, Ill Vls. 413 (1901).
2. Argenta v. Keath, 130 Ark. 334 (1917); Childs Y. City of Columbia,
87 S. C. 566 (1911).
3. In re Blois, 179 Cal. 291 (1918).
[427]
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the same police powers over such airports as they may be authorized to
exercise within the geographical limits of such subdivision,4 and all muni-
cipal corporations were empowered, for corporate purposes, to hold real
estate beyond their limits.5
Apart from statute, the question of the power of a municipality to
impose police regulations beyond its corporate limits seems at best a con-
troverted one. It is difficult to conceive a more evident case of bare ne-
cessity and the exercise of the police power more clearly authorized than on
the facts herein. It -is submitted that in the instant case of a city owning
an airport two miles beyond corporate limits, it must of bare necessity,
if not expressly, have jurisdiction thereof. However, despite this considera-
tion, seemingly, in the absence of enabling legislation, the city could not so
extend its jurisdiction.
Many states hive passed laws authorizing municipalities to acquire,
establish, maintain, and operate airports within or without the city limits,
and some of them have extended the police power of the city to the
airports and their immediate surroundings. An analysis of the cases touch-
ing the question of the right and power of municipalities to establish and
maintain airports has indicated a manifestation of airports being classified
as public harbors in the nature of public utilities. Thus, Hile v. City of
Cleveland,6 was the first of a line of decisions holding that an airport is a
proper city purpose and public enterprise; followed by other decisions of
like effect. 7 Subsequently, an airport has been conveniently placed in the
category of a public utility.8 So, too, the airport was held properly in-
cluded within park purposes.9  In other instances, the municipality was
designated as acting in a proprietary capacity. 10
Statutes authorizing airports are of great practical importance, furnish-
ing as they do, a great stimulus to aviation activities. Because of the
unanimity of the decisions of the courts of the various states, there is prob-
ably sufficient precedent to conclude that the constitutionality of state airport
enabling acts is fairly well established. Particularly emphatic today is the
statement that aviation is no longer an experiment."
The greater problem in all these cases involving municipal airports and
the municipalities' extraterritorial jurisdiction over airports without the
boundaries of the city is that of aviation in general. Thus the airport is to
air transportation what harbors and docks and stations and yards are to
4. Tenn. Public Acts 1931, Ch. 74, Sec. 9.
5. Tenn. Code 1932 Sec. 3334.
6. 26 Ohio App. 138, 160 N. E. 24, 1928 U. S. Av. R. 327 (1927).
7. Hesse V. Rath, 224 App. Div. 344, 1928 U. S. Av. R. 315, Affm. 1929
U. S. Av. R. 10 (New York, 1928) ; Doughty v. Mayor and City Council of
Baltimore, 155 Md. 125, 141 At. 499. 1928 U. S. Av. R. 318 (1928) ; Dysart v.
St. Louis, 11 S. W. (2d) 1045, 1929 U. S. Av. R. 15 (Mo. 1928) ; Ennis v. Kansas
City, 11 S. W. (2d) 1045, 1929 U. S. Av. R. 24 (Mo. 1928) ; McClintock v.
Roseburg, 273 Pac. 331, 1929 U. S. Av. R. 7 (Ore. 1929), comment I Air Law
Rev. 143; Wentz v. City of Philadelphia. 151 At. 883 (Pa. 1930); Spokane
v. Williams, 288 Pac. 258, 1930 U. S. Av. R. 71 (Wash. 1930), note 2 JOURNAL
OF Am LAW 94; Walla Walla v. Clausen, 289 Pac. 61, 1930 U. S. Av. R. 79(Wash. 1930).
8. City of Lincoln v. Johnson, 220 N. W. 273, 1929 U. S. Av. R. 12 (Neb.
1928) Chandler v. Jackson et al., 167 N. E. 396, 1930 U. S. Av. R. 69 (Ohio
1929) State v. Abele, 1190 S. 210, comment 18 Natl. Mun. Rev. 641.
9. City of Wichita v. Clapp, 125 Kans. 100, 1928 U. S. Av. R. 8 (1928);
Schmoldt v. Oklahoma City. 1930 U. S. Av. R. 195, note 1 Air Law Rev. 481;
Ruth v. Oklahoma City. 287 Pac. 119, 1931 U. S. Av. R. 242 (Okla. 1930).
10. Coleman v. City of Oakland, 1931 U. S. Av. R. 61 (1930); Mollencop
V. Salem, 1932 U. S. Av. R. 22 (1932).
11. Carl Zollmann, "Airports," 13 Marq. Law Rev. 97.
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marine and rail transportation. Airports have been well termed "harbors
on the ocean of the air," and as Justice Cardozo said: "Aviation is today
an established method of transportation. The future, even the near future
will make it still more general. The city that is without the foresight to
build the ports for the new traffic may soon be left behind in the race of
competition."12
DAVID AXEI.ROD.
NEGLIGENCE-COMMON CARRIERs-RES IPSA LoQuITUR.-[California] One
of the most interesting and carefully reasoned opinions of a court of last
resort on the applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to aviation
is the California case of Smith v. O'Donnell.1 The case arose out of the
following facts: The defendant O'Donnell was engaged in the business of
carrying passengers for hire, on sight-seeing trips, from the Long Beach
Municipal Airport up and down the road along the ocean. He pursued no
fixed schedule of flights nor had any established termini other than the
airport. The plaintiff was invited by the defendant to take a free ride. The
evidence showed, however, that the defendant desired to incur the plain-
tiff's favor and thereby obtain business from him for his, defendant's, ma-
chine shop. In landing, and when at an altitude of about 50 feet, the de-
fendant's plane descended upon and collided with a plane under the control
of one Ebrite, who was at that time engaged in instructing a student pilot
how to land a plane. Both planes crashed to earth, and the plaintiff received
severe injuries.
The trial court gave four instructions to the jury, all based upon the
proposition that the defendant was a common carrier and that the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur was applicable. The Supreme Court of California held
that the instructions were proper (but judgment for the plaintiff was re-
versed on other grounds).
In reaching its conclusion that the defendant was a common carrier,
the court referred to and distinguished the cases of North American Ac-
cident Insurance Co. v. Pitts,2 and Brown v. Pacific Mutual Life Insurance
Co. of Cal.,8 saying:
"He [the pilot, Lieut. Whitted, in North American Accident Ins. Co.
v. Pitts] operated on such days and under such conditions as pleased him
and did not pretend to make regular schedules. The essential difference
12. Hesse v. Rath, supra note 7.
1. 34 Cal. Dec. 6, 12 P. (2d) 933 (1932).
2. 217 Ala. 102, 104 S. 21, 1928 U. S. Av. R. 178 (1925).
3. 8 F. (2d) 996, 1928 U. S. Av. R. 186 (C. C. A. 5, 1925). See also
Ziser v. Colonial Western Airways, Inc., N. J. Sup. Ct. (Oct. 10, 1932). In
this decision the court says, in speaking of the common carrier: "As to the
degree of care required, the trial court certainly did not err unfavorably to
defendant in leaving the question of common carrier vel non to the jury. The
regulations on taking of passengers cited by counsel as removing defendant
from the common carrier class seem to us to be merely proper rules for such
a carrier to make and enforce, as e. g., no drunken or noisy person to be
taken, no overloading, no flight if weather bad. A set schedule is no
essential of common carrying; nor is such a carrier required, when there is no
set schedule, to operate with half a load. The practice, which the brief asserts
was followed in some cases, of filling the plane to part capacity and then
requiring the intending passengers to leave it and make room for a party
of later arrivals which would fill the plane, might well subject the defendant
to actions for damages unless stipulated in advance, but of itself would not
countervail the other conditions marking defendant as a common carrier. We
think the Judge might properly have charged that defendant was a common
carrier."
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between the instant case and the operations of Lieut. Whitted is that here
the defendant operated a regular place of business for the express purpose
of carrying those who applied."*
The problem of what constitutes a common carrier might well be the
subject of a separate comment. For the purpose of this discussion, it is
suggested that the holding of the federal and Alabama courts in Brown v.
Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. of Cal.,5 and North American Accident Ils.
Co. v. Pitts,6 is open to question. Query: Whether by rejecting negroes,
intoxicated and disorderly persons, a carrier of passengers for hire dis-
qualifies himself as a common carrier. The distinction between private
and common carriers is primarily important to this discussion because of
its effect upon the standard of care exacted of the defendant. It is ele-
mentary that the highest duty of care known to the common law is imposed
upon common carriers and, consequently, when an injury is caused by a
common carrier, the zone of probable undischarged duty is greater than
in cases where only ordinary care is required, so the "inference" or "pre-
sumption" of negligence, which is the mainspring of res ipsa loquitur, is
most readily raised in common carrier cases.7
Probably the earliest decision announcing the theory of res ipsa loquitur
was rendered in 1809 by Lord Mansfield in the case of Christie v. Griggs,8
in holding that, when a passenger was injured by the overturning of a
stagecoach, the burden was upon the owner to prove that he had hired a
good driver, had provided steady horses and a sound coach. Since its
timely inception, the doctrine has been applied to cases of injuries caused
by every mode of common carriage developed by man, viz., stagecoaches,9
steam'O and electric" railroads, steamships,12 scenic railroads,1 automo-
4. See Kingsley, Comment, 3 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 463 (1932).
5. 8 F. (2d) 996, 1928 U. S. Av. R. 186 (C. C. A. 5, 1925).
6. 217 Ala. 102, 104 S. 21, 1928 U. S. Av. R. 178 (1923).
7. Housel v. Pacific Electric Ry., 167 Cal. 245, 139 P. 73 (1914); Terre
Haute & 1. R. R. v. Sheeks, 155 Ind. 74, 56 N. E. 434 (1900) ; Ureunke v. No.
Am. Airways Co., 201 Wis. 565, 230 N. W. 618, 1930 U. S. Av. R. 126 (1930).
8. 2 Camp. 79 (1809).
9. Stokes v. Saltonstall, 13 Pet. 181, 10 L. Ed. 115 (U. S., 1839) Fair-
child v. California Stage Co., 13 Cal. 599 (1859); Boyce v. California Stage
Co.. 25 Cal. 468 (1864).
10. Southern Pac. Co. v. Cavin, 144 4F. 348 (75 C. C. A. 350, 1906) ; Nor-folk d- W. By. v. Birchett 252 F. 512, (1918) ; McCurrie v. So. Pac. Co., 122
Cal. 558, 55 P. 324 (1898); Bonnequ v. No. Shore R. R., 152 Cal. 406, 93
P. 106 (1907) ; Roberts v. Sierra R. R., 14 Cal. App. 180, 111 P. 519 (1910) ;
St. Louis d. S. F. R. R. v. Homer. 137 111. App. 548 (1907) ; Vandalia R. R. v.
Darby, 60 Ind. App. 294, 108 N. E. 778 (1915) ; McNamara v. Boston d. N.
R. R., 202 Mass. 491, 89 N. E. 131 (1909) ; McManamee v. Mo. Pac. By., 135
Mo. 440, 37 S. V. 119 (1896) ; Michaels v. N. Y. Central R. R., 30 N. Y. 564
(1864) ; Dearden v. San Pedro, etc. R. R. 33 Utah 147, 93 P. 271 (1907);
Washington-Virginia Ry. v. Bouknight, 113 Va. 696. 75 S. E. 1032 (1912) ; see.
also: 20 R. C. L. 184; Wigmore, Evidence (2d ed.), 2509.
11. Forsythe v. Los Angeles By., 149 Cal. 269. 86 P. 509 (1906) ; Wyatt
v. Pac. Electric By., 156 Cal. 170, 103 P. 892 (1909) ; McGinn v. New Orleans
R. ( L. Co., 118 La. 811, 43 So. 450 (1907) ; Cassady v. Old Colony St. Ry..
184 Mass. 156, 68 N. E. 10 (1903) ; Roscoe V. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co., 202
Mo. 576, 101 S. W. 32 (1907) ; Price v. Metropolitan St. By. Co., 220 Mo. 435.
119 S. W. 932 (1909); Plumb v. Richmond Light & R. R. Co., 223 N. Y. 285,
135 N. E. 504 (1922).
12. Fowden V. Pac. Coast S. S. Co., 149 Cal. 151, 86 P. 178 (1906).
13. O'Callaghan v. Dellwood Park Co., 242 I1. 336, 89 N. E. 1005 (1909)
Sand Springs Park Co. v. Schroeder, 82 Okla. 244, 198 P. 983 (1921) ; Ten-
nessee State Fair Assn. v. Hartman, 134 Tenn. 159, 183 S. V. 735 (1915-
"ocean wave").
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biles,14 motorcoaches,' 5 taxicabs,1S elevators,17 and, finally, the courts of
New York, Texas and California have indicated that the doctrine will
be applied to injuries caused to passengers by common carriers of the
air.1S
However, it has been seriously urged in recent criticisms that the rule
of res ipsa loquitfr should not be applied to cases involving injuries to
passengers of common carriers by air.l9 What, then, will be the answer of
the law to the challenge of a new era in transportation facilities? Is there
enough elasticity in legal doctrine to keep apace with science?
Referring briefly to the historical development of the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur, two early English cases adhering to the principle laid down
by Lord Mansfield, are significant. In the first of these, Byrne v. Boadle,2 0
in 1863, the plaintiff sought to recover for injuries received by him when
a barrel rolled out of an upper window and fell on him while he was
walking in the street below, and in the latter, Scott v. London and St.
Katherine Docks Co.,2 1 in 1865, the plaintiff was injured by sacks of sugar
which fell upon him while they were being lowered from defendant's
warehouse. In both cases, the English courts followed the rule of res ipsa
loquitur, although not by name. Lord Erle, in the latter case, put down a
concise statement which has been often quoted, saying:
"But where the thing is shown to be under the management of the
defendant or his servants and the accident is such as, in the ordinary course
of things, does not happen if those who have the management use proper
care, it affords reasonable evidence in the absence of explanation by the
defendants that the accident arose from want of care."
The unfairness of requiring a plaintiff to prove facts (negligent acts)
about which he knew nothing, no doubt appealed to the English sporting
sense and the English justices formulated the rule which we now have.
Thus, it was born of reason and fairness. It was quickly seized upon by
Anglo-American courts and their reports since these early cases are replete
with decisions involving an endless variety of factual circumstances in
which the rule has been applied. If the instrumentality causing the injury
14. Jacob v. Ivins, 250 F. 431, 162 C. C. A.-501 (1918) ; Bauhofer v. Craw-ford, 16 Cal. App. 676, 117 P. 931 (1911); Brown v. Davis, 84 Cal. App. 180,
257 P. 877 (1927); Morris v. Morris, 84 Cal. App. 599, 258 P. 616 (1927);
Smith v. Hollander, 85 Cal. App. 535, 259 P. 958 (1927) ; Brown v. Des Moines
Steam Bottling Works, 174 Ia. 715, 156 N. W. 829 (1916); Wallace v. Key-
stone Automobile Co.. 239 Pa. 110, 86 A. 699 (1913). Contra: .Osborne v.
Charbeneau, 148 Vash. 359, 268 P. 884 (1928) ; Klein v. Beeten, 169 Wis. 385,
172 N. W. 736 (1919).
15. Lawrence v. Pickwick Stages, 68 Cal. App. 494, 229 P. 885 (1924)
Mansfield v. Pickwick Stages, 68 Cal. App. 507, 229 P. 890 (1924); Senay v.
Pickwick Stages, 82 Cal. App. 226, 255 P. 279 (1927) ; Carlson v. Kansas City, C.
C. & St. J. Auto Transit Co., 221 Mo. App. 537, 282 S. NV. 1037 (1926) ; a,-
cisco v. Circle Tours Sightseeing Co., 125 Ore. 80, 265 P. 801 (1928).
16. Detroit Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Callahan, 1 F. (2d) 911 (C. C. A.
6, 1924) ; Dowd v. Atlas Taxicab & Auto Service Co., 187 Cal. 523, 202 P.
870 (1921).
17. Griffin v. Manice, 166 N. Y. 188, 59 N. E. 925 (1901).
18. Seaman V. Curtiss Flying Service, 231 App. Div. 867, 247 N. Y. S. 251
1931 U. S. Av. R. 227 (1930) ; Cf.: English v. Miller. 43 S. W. (2d) 642. 1932
U. S. Av. R. 153 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931); Smith v. O'Donnell, 84 Cal. Dec. 6,
12 P. (2d) 933 (1932).
19. Consult: Comment, "Negligence-Res Ipsa Loquitur," 3 JOURNAL OF
AiR LAW 662 (1932) ; Davis, Aeronautical Law (1930 Ed.) 292; Allen, "Trans-
portation by Air and the Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur," 16 Am. Bar Assn.Jour. 455 (1930) ; Osterhout, "The Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur as Applied
to Aviation," 2 Air Law Rev. 9 (1931).
20. 2 Hurl. & C. 722. 159 Eng. Rep. 299 (1863).
21. 3 Hurl. & C. 596 (1865).
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is exclusively controlled by the defendant and if, in the exercise of due
care, accidents of a particular nature do not usually occur from ordinary
operation and user, then it is said by the courts, for the purpose of re-
quiring the defendant to go forward with the evidence and make explana-
tion, that a "presumption" or "inference" of negligence is raised.2 2 Proof
of the mere happening of an accident does not of itself constitute a prima
fade case of negligence, 2  but there must be attendant circumstances from
which a want of due care may be inferred 2 4 or facts from which the court
may take judicial notice that unless negligence had been present in some form
the injury would not have occurred. 25 It is obvious that the last statements
are simply two ways of announcing the same legal principle. The diversi-
fied sets of facts, in addition to those already mentioned in which the
rule has been invoked by a plaintiff to recover for injuries sustained, in-
clude cases where a brick fell from an archway, 26 where electric wires
fell in an alleyway, 27 and across a fence,28 where a boiler exploded,29 where
an awning fell, 0 where burns were caused by the taking of an X-ray,8 '
where a high school student was injured by an exploding test-tube, 2 where
a pedestrian was struck by a skidding automobile, 3 where an automobile
started from an unknown cause,' 4 where gas escaped,"5 where one attend-
ing a theatre slipped and fell on stairway carpet,'6 where a seat in a theatre
collapsed,' 7 where the bucket of a concrete mixer dropped, 8 where drain
pipes on a building fell,'9 and where the wall of a building collapsed. 40
Ii fact, the doctrine has been extended to include almost any accident
where the instrumentality is in the control of the defendant and where
the surrounding circumstances will permit a reasonable inference that there
has been negligence, and from an analysis of the cases it would seem that
wherever the accident is of an extraordinary character, the inference of
negligence is raised.
It is true that the great majority of courts say that res ipsa loquitur
22. Wigmore, Evidence (2nd ed.), p. 2509.
23. Madden V. Occidental, etc., S. S. Co., 86 Cal. 445, 25 P. 5 (1890)
Sappenfleld v. Main St., etc., Co., 91 Cal. 48, 27 P. 590 (1891); O'Connor v.
Mennie, 169 Cal. 217, 146 P. 674 (1915); Benedict v. Potts, 88 Md. 55, 40 A.
1068 (1898); Cassady v. Old Colony St. By. Co., 184 Mass. 156, 68 N. E. 10
(1903) Ash. v. Childs Dining Hall Co., 231 Mass. 86, 120 N. E. 396 (1918)
Pointer v. Mounten Ry. Constr. Co.. 269 Mo. 104, 189 S. V. 805 (1917).
24. O'Connor v. Mennie, supra note 18: McNamara v. Boston & M. R.
Co., 207 Mass. 491, 89 N. E. 131 (1909); De Yoe v. Seattle Electric Co., 53
Wash. 588, 102 P. 446 (1909); Hooman v. City of Seattle, 122 Wash. 379,
210 P. 783 (1922).
25. Russell v. St. Louis etc. R. Co., 245 S. V. 590 (1922).
26. Chenall V. Palmer Brick Co., 117 Ga. 106, 43 S. E. 443 (1902).
27. Gannon V. Laclede Gas Light Co., 145 Mo. 502, 41 S. V. 1094 (1898).
28. Humphrey v. Twin State Gas & Elcc. Co., 100 Vt. 414, 139 A. 440
(1927).
29. Kleinman v. Banner Laundry Co., 150 Minn. 515, 186 N. W. 123
(1921) ; Beall v. Seattle, 28 Wash. 593. 69 P. 12, 92 Am. St. Rep. 892 (1902).
30. Walter v. Ross, 100 Minn. 7, 110 N. W. 252, 10 Ann. Cas. 715, 117
Am. St. Rep. 661 (1907).
31. Sweeney v. Erving, 228 U. S. 233 (1912); Ragin v. Zimmerman, 206
Cal. 723, 276 P. 107 (1929) ; Jones v. Tri-State Tel. t Tel. Co.. 118 Minn. 217.
136 N. W. 741 (1912); Holt v. Ten Broeck, 134 Minn. 458. 159 N. W. 1073
(1916).
32. Damgaard v. Oakland High School, 212 Cal. 316, 298 P. 983 (1931).
33. Seney v. Pickwick Stages, 82 Cal. App. 226, 255 P. 279 (1927).
34. Cleveland Ice Creani Co. v. Call. 28 Ohio App. 521, 162 N. E. 812
(1928) Wallace v. Keystone Automobile Co., 239 Pa. 110, 86 A. 699 (1913).
35. Wright v. So. Counties Gas Co., 102 Cal. App. 656, 283 P. 823 (1929).
36. Sharpless v. Pantages, 178 Cal. 122, 172 P. 384 (1918).
37. Fox V. Bronx Amusement Co., 9 Ohio A p. 426 (1918).
38. Meyer v. Tobin, 82 Cal. Dec. 565. 4 P. (2d) 542 (1931).
39. Michener v. Hutton, 203 Cal. 604, 265 P. 238 (1928).
40. Waterhouse v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 16 S. D. 592, 94 N. W. 587
(1900).
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is a rule of evidence only, but, realistically, it must be conceded that it
materially affects the liability of defendants embraced in this class of
cases. The rule may be justified upon the grounds of public policy; that
is, its tendency to induce a greater standard of care as some protection
against the growing hazards of a highly mechanized society. When the
rule of res ipsa loquitur is viewed thus realistically, its close relationship
to the rule of absolute liability announced in Fletcher v. Rylands,4 ' and to
the so-called "humanitarian doctrine" followed in the Missouri courts,42
is readily perceived. The interesting lines which mark the distinctions
between the various degrees of liability for injuries resulting to others
from the use of one's property, are really shifting and the elasticity of
the common law is demonstrated.
Professor Francis H. Bohlen, in discussing the effect of the rebuttable
presumption of negligence arising from the application of res ipsa loquitur,
states:
"The legal force of a presumption is . . . the additional weight
given by it to data not in itself of sufficient probative force to permit or
require the jury to find the existence of the fact presumed. All such pre-
sumptions are therefore created by some policy of law which requires this
abnormal weight to be given to meet some judicially felt need or to accom-
plish some purpose recognized as desirable." 43
That the real reason for the rule, particularly in cases of common
carriers and evidenced by the multitude of decisions involving carriers by
rail, is predicated upon public policy, cannot be questioned. The courts
of Iowa go so far as to admit that the rule in the case of a common car-
rier actually shifts the burden of proof and places the risk of non-persuasion
upon the defendant. 44 Obviously, the same public interest which seeks to
protect travellers by rail must reach forward to protect travellers by air.
A passenger on an airplane can never know what act or omission of the
pilot or what act of negligence in the maintenance of the airway system
has resulted in his injury. The theory of the public policy involved was
very succinctly stated by the Supreme Court of California in the instant
case:
"It may safely be asserted that there is no mode of transportation
where the passenger's safety is so completely entrusted to the care and
skill of the carrier. To indulge for a moment in the speculation which
follows in the wake of the statement just made, if there are those in the
business of carrying passengers in the air today (and we do not say there
are) who are sufficiently unmindful of their humanitarian duties as to
neglect to employ the utmost care in the selection and operation of their
craft, the industry and the public both will benefit by the application of
a rule of liability which will either require such care or ultimately eliminate
them from this field of service." 45
41. L. R. 3 H. L. 330 (1868).
42. Barrie v. St. Louis Transit Co., 102 Mo. App. 87, 26 S. W. 706 (1903)
Murphy v. Wabash ly. Co., 228 Mo. 56, 128 S. W. 481 (1910).
43. Bohlen, "The Effect of Rebuttable Presumptions of Law Upon the
Burden of Proof," 68 U. of Penn. Law Rev. 307, 313 (1920).
44. Weber v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 175 Ia. 358, 151 N. W. 852
(1915); cf.: Mitchell v. So. Pac. R. Co., 87 Cal. 62, 25 P. 245 (1890); Raub
v. Los Angeles Terminal By. Co., 103 Cal. 473, 37 P. 374 (1894); Worden
v. Central Fireproof Bldg. Co., 172 Cal. 94, 155 P. 839 (1916); Terre Haute
A 1. R. Co. v. Sheeks, 155 Ind. 74, 56 N. E. 435 (1900); Orcutt v. Century
Bldg. Co., 201 Mo. 424, 99 S. W. 1062 (1906); Sand Springs Park Co. v.
Schrader, 82 Okla. 244, 198 P. 983 (1921).
45. Smith v. O'Donnell, 84 Cal. Dec. 6, 12 P. (2d) 933 (193 ).
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The advocates of the contrary position urge two major propositions:
(a) That the application of the doctrine to aeronautical accidents would
tend to stifle an infant industry;46 and (b) that, due to the natural hazards
of air transportation, the inference of negligence cannot reasonably be
raised from the occurrence of an accident.47 The answer on principle to
the first proposition is ably stated in the foregoing excerpt from the opin-
ion of the California Supreme Court. The practical answer is that it is
entirely possible for air carriers to cover themselves against liability for
passenger accidents by a system of insurance, thus spreading the losses
involved. One recent commentator has said:
"Premiums for aviation public liability and property damage insurance
are lower than premiums for the same coverage on a large baggage or
express truck or a truck used for general hauling. Premium rates for all
forms of aviation insurance are based on loss experience-as improvements
in the design and construction of aircraft continue and as the skill and
experience of the operating personnel increase, so may we expect a decrease
in the premium rates for practically all classes of aviation." 4s
Professor Edwin C. Goddard discusses a similar problem with reference
to the liability of the common carrier of baggage, stating that but for an
unfortunate decision of Mr. Justice Nelson the common carrier would
have remained an insurer without possibility of limitation of liability. He
states.
"The carrier would have remained an insurer, and would it not have
been to his advantage as well as to that of the shipper? The slight addi-
tional cost of insurance would have been spread by the carrier over his
tariffs and eventually paid by the public. The shipper would have been
protected by the payment of a slight additional cost to his carrier costs
and both would have been saved the huge cost of litigation that from that
day to this has flooded the courts with questions about the limitations of
the carrier's liability. Moreover, the carrier would have avoided much of
the resulting irritation and ill-will on the part of the public... .,49
Commenting upon the desirability of a rule of absolute liability, for
common carriers, Mr. Arthur A. Ballantine, in an article in the Harvard
Law Review,5 o says:
"The establishment of such liability would have a direct tendency to
make transportation more safe; it has been found that since employers have
been absolutely liable for accidents to employees the number of such acci-
dents has decreased. Such a regulation would relate directly to the char-
acter of the service, for the protection of the passenger through compensa-
tion against financial loss from injury is as clearly a part of the service as
protection from the injury itself."5 1
Although there is no judicial decision indicating that a rule of ab-
solute liability will be adopted for aircraft or any other common carriers,
46. Allen, "Limitations of Liability to Passengers by Air Carriers," 2
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 325 (1931).
47. Osterhout, "The Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur as Applied to Avia-
tion," 2 Air Law Rev. 9 (1931).
48. Crowdus, "Aviation Insurance," 2 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 176 (1931).
49. Goddard, "The Liability of the Common Carrier as Determined by
Recent Decisions of the United States Supreme Court," 15 Col. Law Rev. 399
(1915).
50. Ballantine "Compensation Plan for Railway Accident Claims," 29
Harv. Law Rev. 765 (1916); Mondou v. N. Y., N. H. c H. R. Co., 223 U. S.
1, 32 Sup. Ct. 169 (1911).
51. Italics ours.
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it is true that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur achieves approximately the
same beneficial results for the public, and it was evidently upon that ground
that the California Supreme Court reached its decision in the instant case.
As to the second objection stated above, the statistics prepared semi-
annually by the Department of Commerce indicate that serious accidents
are very rare in air transport service. One reference to the facts is typical.
From January, 1930, to December, 1931, a general average of 9,414,428
passenger miles were flown in scheduled air transport service per passenger
fatality.5 2 The common carriers by air are constantly advertising to the
public the high quality of safety of their transport systems. The Depart-
ment of Commerce regulations require air transport companies to maintain
meteorological stations, to provide for adequate inspection of the mechanical
and structural parts of the plane, to maintain adequate airports with modern
lighting facilities and to engage only highly skilled pilots. Certainly, the
defendant, under such conditions, is better able to explain whether or not
he has complied with. these requirements: Under such circumstances, it
would seem only fair to hold them to all of the liabilities of common car-
riers under our system of law, and the holding in the instant case seems
sound in this respect. The accident involved in the instant case was a
collision between two airplanes and it was urged that the doctrine should
not be applied due to the fact that two vehicles were involved and either
might have caused the injuries of the plaintiff. Although there is some con-
fusion, the weight of authorities is to the effect that presumption of neg-
ligence arises against the carrier in whose vehicle the plaintiff was at the
time of the accident. 52 In principle, this is consistent with the orthodox
statement of the rule of res ipsa loquitur which permits the defendant to
show that any other cause than his own negligence was the proximate
cause of the injuries of the plaintiff.
The Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in the case of Wilson v. Colonial
Airways,5 4 apparently reached an opposite conclusion to that of the Cali-
fornia court in the instant case. The Massachusetts case arose out of the
following facts: A tri-motored Ford transport plane was taking off on a
scheduled flight from Boston to New York. One of its motors failed in
the takeoff and it fell into the bay. The Massachusetts court found that
the inspection of the plane had not been under the control of the defendants
immediately prior to the takeoff.55 Further, the plaintiff in his pleadings
relied upon an allegation of a faulty engine, thereby relieving the defendant
of a general l6urden of exculpation, 56 and consequently the court held that
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was inapplicable. Although in these re.
52. U. S. Department of Commerce, 3 Air Commerce Bulletin 407 (1932).
53. Osgood v. Los Angeles Traction Co., 137 Cal. 280, 70 P. 169 (1902);
Houghton v. Market St. By. Co., 1 Cal. App. 576, 82 P. 972 (1905); Housel
v. Pac. Electric By. Co., 157 Cal. 245, 139 P. 73 (1910) ; Scarborough v. Urgo,
191 Cal. 341, 216 P. 584 (1923); Atkinson v. United R. R. of San Francisco,
71 Cal. App. 82, 234 P. 863 (1925); Kilgore v. Brown, 90 Cal. App. 555, 266
P. 297 (1928); Wright v. So. Counties Gas Co., 102 Cal. App. 656, 283 P.
823 (1929) ; Smith v. O'Donnell. 84 Cal. Dec. 6, 12 P. (2d) 933 (1932) ; Plumb
v. Richmond Light & R. Co., 223 N. Y. 285, 135 N. E. 504 (1922). Contra:
Harrison v. Sutter St. Ry. Co., 134 Cal. 549, 66 P. 787 (1901); Keller v.
Cushman, 104 Cal. App. 186. 285 P. 399 (1930).
54. 180 N. E. 212, 1932 U. S. Av. R. 139 (Mass., 1932).
55. Stangy v. Boston Elevated lBy., 220 Mass. 414, 107 N. E. 933 (1915)
Reardon v. Boston Elevated Ry., 247 Mass. 124, 141 N. E. 857 (1923); Di
Leo v. Eastern Mass. St. By., 255 Mass. 140, 160 N. E. 891 (1926).
,56. Harper & Heckel, "Effect of the Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur," 22
Ill. Law Rev. 724 (1927) : Niles, "Pleading Res Ipsa Loquitur," 7 N. Y. Univ.
Law Quart. Rev. 415 (1929).
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spects the cases are distinguishable, substantially they seem to present a
conflict of authority.5 7 However, from the language of the opinion in
the Massachusetts case, it seems reasonable to infer that had the plaintiff
shown the instrumentality to have been within the exclusive control of the
defendant or his agents, the rule of res ipsa loquitur would have been
applied. 5s
The reasoning of the court in the instant case, Smith v. O'Donnell, ap-
pears to be more consistent with an expansion of accepted principles of law
to meet the changing social conditions of our modern civilization. "If the
proper degree of care is used a collision in midair does not ordinarily
occur . . . ." Will the decision in the California case be a precedent
for other American jurisdictions? The answer to that question will be
awaited with interest by the members of both the bench and bar.
SAm E. GATES.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-AIRPLANE CRASH-VIOLATION OF STAT-
UTE.-[Federal] Deceased, an employee of an oil company, lost his life in
an aeroplane crash. He had owned the plane for about three years and,
although he had neither aircraft license nor pilot's license, had acted as his
own pilot. He had used the plane occasionally for business, without the
authorization or knowledge of employer (who knew that he owned it)-
the employer furnishing an automobile for business purposes. On the day
of the crash, deceased flew to a nearby town for supplies and, on the take-
off for the return flight, the plane crashed, deceased being fatally injured.
An action was brought tinder the Texas Workmen's Compensation Law.
Held, defendant cannot recover. Bugh v. Employers' Reinsurance Corpora-
tion, 63 Fed. (2d) 36 (C. C. A. 5th 1933).
The opinion of the court, although rather ambiguous, appears to be
based on the ground that deceased was acting outside the scope of his em-
ployment, on two theories: (1) that he was exposing himself to a peril
not reasonably inherent in his work; and (2) that the violation of the
statute, being unauthorized, removed him from such scope.
As to statutory breach and its effect upon ability to recover under the
57. Axelrod, Comment, 3 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 662 (1932).
58. Wilson v. Colonial Air Transport, Inc., 180 N. E. 212, 1932 U. S. Av.
R. 139 (Mass., 1932) : "The rules of law relating to the operation of aircraft,
in the absence of statute, in general are rules relating to negligence and
nuisance, and are not distinguishable from those which relate to the opera-
tion of vehicles, perhaps more closely, to motor vehicles on land. In this
Commonwealth at present there is no statute specifically applicable to the
issue of negligence in the operation of aircraft, and the ordinary rules of
negligence and due care obtain. * * * The principle res ipsa loquitur
only applies where the direct cause of the accident and so much of the sur-
rounding circumstances as were essential to its occurrence were within the
sole control of the defendants or their servants. * * * It Is to be noted
that the presumption raised in favor of the plaintiff by the application of the
res ipsa loquitur doctrine is one of evidence and not of substances, and that
the burden of proof remains during the trial upon the plaintiff. * * *
It is also to be observed that the doctrine will not be applied if there was
no negligence at all; nor does it apply in any instance when the agency
causing the accident is not under the sole and exclusive control of the person
sought to be charged with the Injury. * * * There is nothing in the record
to indicate by whom the airplane was inspected. It does not appear that
the inspectors, to whom the pilot, according to his testimony, turned over
the airplane on his arrival, and from whom he received it a few minutes be-
fore he took off, were employed by the defendant. They may have been
servants of an independent contractor or of one conducting an independent
business, to whom as mechanics skilled in aircraft the defendant In the exer-
cise of a high degree of care committed the inspection and repair of' the
airplane."
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Workmen's Compensation Law; in general, the gravamen of the matter
seems to be whether the sphere of employment is limited by the prohibition.
This was the rule laid down by Lord Dunedin in the leading case of
Plumb v. Cobden Flour Mills Company, Ltd.1 In the case of A. G. Moore
& Co. v. Donnelly,2 this doctrine was applied to statutory prohibitions as
well as to prohibitions of the employer. The general rule, then, is that if
the statute is one limiting the sphere of employment of the workman, the
violation of such statute will bar recovery,3 whereas, on the other hand,
.if the statute is one which directs the mode of performance of a task, or
directs that a task be not done in a certain manner, the workman is still
within the sphere of employment even though he disobeys the statute.4
Under the statutes of most of the States, including Texas, "wilful mis-
.conduct"6 bars recovery. The courts, therefore, when not able to find a
bar to liability due to the fact the employee has, by statutory violation,
acted without the sphere of employment, have the possibility of finding
that the statutory breach constituted "willful misconduct." Generally, lia-
bility is barred on the basis of "willful misconduct," when the statute
violated was designed especially to protect the employee. Whether it was
so designed is a matter of fact.6 California seems to have gone quite far
in finding "willful misconduct," for in the case of Fidelity & Deposit Com-
pany of Maryland v. Industrial Accident Commission7 it was held that a
violation of an. automobile speed regulation barred recovery. There have
been modifications and refinements of the doctrine, but the principles men-
tioned above are the ones most frequently enunciated by the courts. Of
course, in order that a breach of statute (or employer's rule) act as a
bar to recovery on the basis either of the workman having acted beyond
the scope of authority or of the breach constituting "willful misconduct,"
there must be proximate cause between the breach and the injury.8
In what is apparently the only other case squarely considering the
application of these rules to aviation, it was held that acrobatic flying at
the time of the crash, in violation of a statute forbidding it, constituted an
act without the scope of employment.9 In the instant case, the scope of
1. [1914] A. C. 62, 7 B. R. C. 128, Ann. Cas. 1914B 495, 30 T. L. R. 174
(1913).
2. [1921] 1 A. C. 329, 37 T. L. Rep. 198, 65 S. J. 219 (H. L. 1920).
3. Campbell or Robertson v. Woodilee Coal & Coke Co., Ltd., 123 L. T.
Rep. 113, 64 S. J. 374 (H. L. 1920); A. G. Moore &6 Co. v. Donnelly [19211
1 A. C. 329, 37 T. L. Rep. 198, 65 S. J. 219 (H. L. 1920); Walcofski v. Lehigh
Valley Coal Co., 278 Pa. 84, 122 At. 238 (1923) ; Pokis v. Buck Run Coal Co.,
286 Pa. 52, 132 Atl. 795 (1926) ; Macenka v. Lehigh C. & Nav. Co., 104 Pa.
Super. Ct. 591 (1932).
4. Western Pac. By. v. Ind. Ace. Comm., 193 Cal. 413, 224 Pac. 754(1924); Chicago Rys. v. Ind. Bd.. 276 Ill. 112, 114 N. E. 534 (1916); accord,
where the violation was of a rule of the employer; Alexander v. Ind. Bd.,
281 Ill. 201, 117 N. E. 1040 (1917) ; Von Ette'8 Case, 223 Mass. 56, 111 N. E.
696, L. R. A. 1916D 641, 12 N. C. C. A. 551 (1916) ; Milwaukee v. Ind. Comm.,
160 Wis. 238, 151 N. W. 247, 248 (1915).
5. It is to be noted that, although the wording of the phrase varies from
State to State, essentially the meaning Is the same. The Texas statutes.
Tex. Vernon's Comp. Stats. (1928), Art. 8306, §1(3), and Art. 8309, §1, use
the term "willful Intention."
6. Bay Shore Laundry Co. V. Ind. Ace. Comm., 36 Cal. App. 547, 172 Pac.
1128 (1918).
7. 171 Cal. 728, 154 Pac. 834. L. R. A. 1916D 903 (1916).
8. Great Western Electro-Chem. Co. v. Ind. Ace. Comm., 35 Cal. App.
450, 170 Pac. 165 (1917); Western Pac. R. R. v. Ind. Ace. Comm., 180 Cal.
416, 181 Pac. 787 (1919); Wood v. Snyder, 83 Ind. App. 31, 147 N. E. 814
(1925).
9. Datln v. Vale, 1931 U. S. Av. R. 175 (Pa. 1931) ; see Sheboygan Air-
ways Inc. v. Ind. Comm., 245 N. W. 178, 49 U. S. C. A. 171, 1932 U. S. Av.
R. 222, 224-225 (Wis. 1932).
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the employment is definitely limited by the licensing statutes. Under the
Texas statute, it is stated definitely that one is barred from acting as an
aviator unless lie and the plane are licensed by federal license. 10 On the
other hand, it would seem that there is a lack of showing of causal con-
nection between the absence of an airman's license and the crash, especially
since the deceased was an experienced aviator." It would seem to be
analogous to the cases of colliding when driving illegally without a chauf-
feur's license, which does not bar recovery. 12 The court might have as-
sumed a better position if they had barred recovery solely on the basis of.
absence of plane license, for obviously, in the case of a three-year-old plane,
the absence of the plane license might be quite significant. It would appear,
however, that the court should not attempt to bar liability on the statutory
basis alone; the question of proximate cause would seem to be one which
should be inquired into, which was not done by the court in the instant case.
As to whether the plaintiff would be barred on the basis of "willful
misconduct," the inquiry must be made as to whether the statutes requir-
ing licenses were intended to protect the airman. It would appear from
the reading of the Texas statute that it was intended for the protection of
the public, not of the airman, for it states: "The public safety requiring
and the advantages of uniform regulation making it desirable in the inter-
est of aeronautical progress ..... ."1 On the basis of this statement, it
would appear that the plaintiff might prevail, since the statute was not
designed especially, for the protection of the employee, but of the public.14
ROBERT A. MENDELSON.
DIGESTS
CRIMINAL LAW-TRANSPORTATION OF LIQUOR BY AIRCRAFT--EVIDENCE.-
[Federal] This is an appeal from a conviction obtained in the United
States District Court, fifth circuit, for the carrying of liquor in an air-
plane. Flying from New Orleans to a point in Michigan, the plane in
which the appellant, owner and a pilot were flying, was forced down in
Mississippi and some fifteen cases of imported liquor taken from a hidden
compartment in the rear of the cabin. Appellant, though admitting to a
prohibition agent that the plane had been loaded with liquor in New Orleans,
later took the position that his confession was inadmissable, inasmuch as
there was not separate proof that the plane had been loaded with liquor
before it had left New Orleans and it would be as consistent with the
10. Tex. Vernon's Comp. Stats. (1931 Supp.), Art. 1137b, §2, states: "The
public safety requiring and the advantages of uniform regulation making itdesirable in the interest of aeronautical progress that aircraft operating within
this State should conform with respect to design, construction, and airworthi-
ness to the standards prescribed by the United States Government with respect
to navigation of aircraft subject to its jurisdiction, it shall be unlawful for
any person to navigate an aircraft within the State, whether for commercial,
pleasure, or non commercial purposes, unless it is licensed and registered by
the Departments of Commerce of the United States in the manner prescribed
by the lawful rules and regulations of the United States Government then in
force."
§3. "No person shall serve as an airman in connection with any civil
aircraft when such aircraft is flown or operated in this state until he shall
have obtained a license under the provisions of the Federal Air Commerce Act
of 1926 and amendments thereto and the Air Commerce Regulations and Air
Traffic Rules pursuant thereto."
11. Compare: Dominion Air Lines, Ltd. v. Strand, 8 N. Z. L. Jour. 342(New Zealand Court of Appeal, Dec. 9, 1932), discussed in 4 JOURNAL OF AiR
LAW, 272 (1933).
12. Wood v. Snyder, 83 Ind. App. 31, 147 N. E. 314 (1925).
13. Tex. Vernon's Comp. Stats. (1931 Supp.), Art. 1137b, §2.
14. Compare: Dominion Air Lines, Ltd. v. Strand, 8 N. Z. L. Jour. 342
(New Zealand Court of Appeal. Dec. 9, 1932).
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evidence to state that the plane had been loaded after being forced to
land. Held: it is within the province of the jury to decide whether the
liquor was in the plane before it landed or was placed therein after land-
ing. Appellant's confession that he was the transporter was definitely ad-
missible, for, since the liquor was a foreign product and must therefore
have been transported by someone to the place where it was found, any
supposition is completely broken down that the liquor was loaded in the
plane after the forced landing. Judgment affirmed. Vinkemulder v. U. S.,
64 f. (2d) 535. Decided April 19, 1933, U. S. C. C. A., 5th Circuit,
Mississippi.
KATHERINE FRITTS.
GASOLINE TAX-COMMERCE--STATE TAX ON GASOLINE USED IN INTER-
STATE COMMERCE.--[U. S. Supreme Court] A Wyoming statute (Wyoming
Laws of 1929, Sp. Sess., c. 14, amending Laws of 1929, c. 139) levies a
"license tax of four cents per gallon . . . on all gasoline used or sold
in this state . . . for domestic consumption" and requires every "whole-
saler" engaged in the "sale or use of gasoline" within the state to report
to the state treasurer each month all the gasoline "sold or used" by it in
the state, and to pay the tax upon it. The term "wholesaler" is defined
and the statute further provides that "every person . . . who shall use
any gasoline in this state upon which the said tax has not been paid by
any wholesaler in this State" shall render a like statement and pay a like
tax. Respondent brought suit in equity against the state tax officials and
the cities of Cheyenne and Rock Springs, with which cities it had con-
tracted for the use of their municipal landing fields, to enjoin the collec-
tion of a state excise tax levied upon the use of gasoline by respondent
within the state, as a violation of the commerce clause of the Constitu-
tion. The trial court upheld the tax and dismissed the bill. This decree
was reversed by the Circuit Court of Appeals and the injunction was
ordered: 61 F. (2d) 130, and see comment 4 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 113.
The case then went to the United States Supreme Court on a writ of
certiorari, where the judgment of the lower court was reversed.
Respondent made no objection to the collection of a tax on the gasoline
which it purchased in the state, and on which the tax had not been paid
by the wholesaler, as well as on all gasoline which it sold within the state
at its airport or withdrew from the tanks for local use. The contention
of respondent, upheld by the Court of Appeals, was that the tax cannot
validly be applied to the gasoline imported from outside the state, stored
in tanks at the airports and used for "filling" the interstate airplanes in
which it is eventually consumed. The only question before the United
States Supreme Court was whether the taxation of the gasoline which
respondent withdraws from storage and uses for "filling" its planes im-
posed an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce.
The Supreme Court upheld the interpretation of the statute as given
by the officers of -the State that the tax is not unconstitutional since it is
not levied upon the consumption of gasoline in furnishing motive power
for respondent's interstate planes, but is rather applied to the stored gasoline
as it is withdrawn from the storage tanks at the airport and placed in the
planes. The stored gasoline is deemed to be "used" within the state and
therefore subject to the tax, when it is withdrawn from the tanks. The
Court followed Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. v. Wallace, 287
U. S. - (1933) and held: a state may validly tax the "use" to which
gasoline is put in withdrawing it from storage within the state, and plac-
ing it in the tanks of planes, notwithstanding that its ultimate function
is to generate motive power for carrying on interstate commerce. The stor-
age and withdrawal from storage of the gasoline is complete before inter-
state commerce begins, and the burden of the tax is too indirect and remote
from the function of interstate commerce to transgress constitutional limi-
tations. Edelman, State Treasurer, et al. v. Boeing Air Transport, Inc.,
53 S. Ct. R. 591, decided April 17, 1933.
LORRAINE ARNOLD.
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NEGLIGENCE-DAMAGE TO AIRCRAFT-EVIDENCE-PROOF OF PARTNERSHIP.-
[Nebraska] The plaintiff was the owner of a Pitcairn airplane which,
on the night of January 29, 1931, was parked on the north side of the
hangar in Omaha. A Stinson plane, which was alleged to be partnership
property of defendants Arnold and Cahow, was parked on the south side
of the hangar. Defendant Cahow attempted to start the motor of the
Stinson but did not have it under control and the plane crossed the hangar
apron and crashed into plaintiff's Pitcairn on the other side of the hangar.
It was alleged that defendant Calow violated certain Department of Com-
merce regulations in that no starting blocks had been placed under the
wheels of the Stinson, that it was not in charge of a licensed mechanic or
pilot, and that it was not equipped for night flying. Plaintiff sued for
$1700 damages. Defendant Cahow filed no pleadings, nor did he make
any appearance at the trial. The District Court, at the close of evidence,
sustained defendant Arnold's motion and dismissed the plaitiff's action
against him. Plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court of Nebraska.
The sole question for the Court to determine was whether the evi-
dence was sufficient to prove that a partnership existed between defendants
at the time of the accident and that they were therefore jointly liable for
the damage to plaintiff's plane. In that case, the trial court erred in with-
drawing the case from the jury and dismissing the action as against Arnold.
An examination of the evidence showed that defendant Arnold denied
that he was the owner or in any way responsible for the operation of the
Stinson at the time of the accident and he denied that defendant Cahow
was his agent or partner. Arnold offered evidence to show that the pur-
chasers intended to form a corporation and that such corporation for the
handling of the plane had been formed before the accident occurred. On
the other hand, from the deposition of defendant Cahow, evidence was
offered to show that a partnership did exist between Arnold and Cahow.
In the light of this conflicting and disputed evidence from which different
minds might draw different conclusions, the Court Held: plaintiff was
entitled to have a jury pass on the question as to whether the facts offered
in evidence were sufficient to warrant a finding that defendants were part-
ners at the time of the accident and therefore jointly liable for the dam-
age to plaintiff's plane. The lower court therefore erred in withdrawing
the case from the jury and dismissing the action against Arnold. The
judgment was reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings.
Interstate Airlines, Inc. v. Arnold, et al., 247 N. W. R. 358 (1933).
LORRAINE ARNOLD.
NEGLIGENCE-TRANSPORTATION OF AIRPLANE ALONG A PUBLIC HIGHWAY-
VIOLATION OF STATUT.-[South Dakota] The plaintiffs who jointly owned
a Curtiss biplane wished to fly it from a field two miles from their home.
In furtherance of that purpose, they attached the tail of the plane to the
rear of an automobile and thus towed it along the public highway in the
direction of the field. The road was completely obstructed by the wings
of the plane which extended beyond the width of the road. To circum-
vent the passage of other travelers, one of the plaintiffs would go on ahead
when someone appeared and signal with a white flag for the conveyance
to come to a stop, go up a side road or make such arrangements as the
situation warranted. The defendant was signalled as were others, but he
totally disregarded plaintiff's efforts of safety, and ran his car into the
right wing of the plane. An action for damages, because of defendant's
failure to exercise due care, resulted in a verdict and judgment for the
plaintiff for $500 and cost. Defendant's motion for a new trial was denied,
whereupon he appealed upon two grounds: (1) the evidence was not
sufficient to sustain the verdict; (2) as a matter of law the plaintiff was
contributorily negligent, since he violated a statute. The court resolved
both objections in favor of the plaintiff. Harvison, et al. v. Herrick, 248
N. W. 205. Decided April 24, 1933, by the Supreme Court of South Dakota.
The second objection is of interest. A statute, Rev. Code, 1919, Sec.
4309, provides that "every person who shall without authority . . . ob-
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struct . . . any public highway . . . shall be deemed guilty of a
misdemeanor . . . and liable for all damages to person or property by
reason of the same." However, another statute, L. 1927, Ch. 141, Sec. 3,
allows for the transportation of a large article over the highway after the
issuance of a special written permit for a single trip by the County High-
way superintendent. The violation in the instant situation consisted in not
having the special permit. The court refused to look upon this violation as
negligence per se, unless it in some manner contributed as part of the
proximate cause of the damage. The presence of the permit, it was believed,
would not have varied the plaintiff's operations; they exercised due care.
Apparently, the court extended itself to reach this result. The statute
expressly makes any obstructor of the highway, without authority, liable
for damages. This provision seems to create negligence per se, yet the court
refused to so rule. The statute furthermore was intended to protect trav-
elers on the road from the dangers of obstructions. The special permit
was in the form of a dispensation in special situations. While the actual
presence of the permit in the plaintiff's pocket may not have avoided the
accident, yet it must be assumed that it would only be granted after a
careful analysis of dangers by the highway superintendent. The question
of proximate cause when a statute has been violated is really an attempt
to discover whether the statute proposes to protect from the type of injury
involved. Cf. Green, Rationale of Proximate Cause [1927], p. 40. For a
criticism of the use of proximate cause in statutory and administrative
violations, see comment, 4 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 283-5; and for a discussion
of the effect of a violation of a statute upon the question of negligence,
see comment, 4 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 285.
LEO FREEDMAN.
TAXATION-STAMP TAX ON AIRCRAFT PASSENGER TICKETS-AIRCRAFT AS
VESSELS WITHIN MEANING OF FE.ERAL REVENUE AcT.-[Federal] In Gen-
eral Counsel's Memorandum No. 7152 (C. B. VIII-2, 429), the conclusion
was reached that the stamp tax, provided for in Schedule A(5), Title VIII,
of the Revenue Act of 1926, as amended by Section 442 of the Revenue Act
of 1928, imposing a stamp tax on tickets sold or issued in the United States
for passage by vessel to foreign ports other than ports in Canada, Mexico,
or Cuba, is not applicable to tickets for passage by land planes, but that it
is applicable to tickets for passage on seaplanes, hydroplanes or amphibians.
By Rev. Stat. Sec. 3, "The word 'vessel' includes every description of
water craft or other artificial contrivance used, or capable of being used,
as a means of transportation on water."
The ruling in G. C. M. No. 7152 was questioned and has since been
modified, largely upon the authority of the case of McBoyle v. United States,
283 U. S. 25; see comment 2 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 437 (1931). Admittedly,
the term "vessel" etymologically is broad enough to signify any container,
irrespective of the medium in which it operates. Yet, in its common
meaning, when used with respect to transportation, the term signifies some
craft which actually moves and conducts its business of transportation on
the water. When Congress has used the term in a statute pertaining to
water carriage, the statute should not be construed as applicable to aircraft
whose use of the water is only for taking-off and landing, and not at all
during its main business of transportation by air. The brief presented in
behalf of counsel also indicated the discriminatory effects of such an in-
terpretation as between passengers using the various aircraft services-even
on a single airline. 'As stated, G. C. M. No. 7152 was modified by G. C. M.
No. 11539, XII-13-6104, 233 C. C. H. 3051.
F. D. F.
TAXATION-EXEMPTION-LAND LEASED AS NAVAL AVIATION BASE CON-
STRUED AS ARMORY.-[Michigan] Five acres of land were acquired by the
state of Michigan upon which was expended $100,000 by the state and
$500,000 by the federal government to establish an airport. To this was
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added 379 acres of leased land, to form a United States Naval Reserve
aviation base. The land which was leased and the equipment contained
thereon was placed on the assessment roll by the assessor of the township.
Protest was made on the ground that the land was not legally assessable
since it was being used for military purposes. Section 692 of the Com-
piled Laws of Michigan [1929] exempts from taxes "armories erected"
by governmental or private agencies and used by the militia. The town-
ship board of review refused the exemption whereupon an appeal was
taken to the State Tax Commission where the exemption was granted.
The court in the instant case upheld the order of the State Commission.
It was admitted that armories in-their narrow sense would not include stir-
rounding land, but to further the intent of the statute in increasing the
efficiency of the military establishment of the state, a broad construction
was adopted. It was pointed out that surrounding lands used for drilling
purposes are part of a military establishment. The land here in question
when properly leased for an aviation base is part of the military establish-
ment and therefore exempt from taxation.
Three judges dissented, pointing out that statutes exempting private
property from taxation must be strictly construed. Further, that the words
"armories erected" obviously referred to buildings only and so carried its
own boundaries by clear legislative expression. Grosse lie Tp. et al v.
Saunders et al.. - Mich. -, 247 N. W. 912 (April 4, 1933).
LEO FREEDMAN.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-AIRCRAFT PILOT AS EMPLOYEE OR INDEPEND-
ENT CONTRACTOR-CoMPENSATION.-[Texas] Plaintiff brought suit to recover
workmen's compensation for the death of her husband, an airplane pilot
in the employ of the Texas Worth Tool Company, a corporation, which
carried workmen's compensation insurance with appellant company. From
a judgment in favor of the plaintiff given in the District Court, defendant
company brought error to the Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Writ of
error was granted.
The deceased was employed by Mennis, the President and General
Manager of the Texas Worth Tool Company, to pilot the plane belonging
to him (Mennis) as and when needed, for $10 a day and expenses. When
the plane was used in the corporation's business the President and General
Manager reported his expenses of such trips and included as such the $10
a day and expenses of the pilot, and the corporation paid same. Kelly,
the pilot, worked under this arrangement on an average of 3 days a week
for 3 months before the accident occurred, although his pay was not in-
cluded in the pay roll of the company, on which premiums for the policy
sued on were computed. The accident occurred when Kelly was piloting
the plane for his employer on corporation business, and both pilot and
employer were killed.
On special issues the jury found that Kelly was an employee of the
Texas Worth Tool Company, was in the course of his employment, was
not in the employ of Mennis, the President and General Manager, that $70
a week was an average weekly wage, and that Mennis was not an inde-
pendent contractor on this trip, nor was deceased, Kelly.
The Court of Civil Appeals examined the assignments of error and
Held: (1) The evidence was sufficient to support the verdict finding that
deceased pilot was an "employee" of the Texas Worth Tool Company and
not an "independent contractor" since (a) the materials and appliances of
his work were supplied by a person who had the right to stand in the
place of the company, and did so, according to the finding of the jury; (b)
there was no evidence that Kelly exercised or claimed any control over
his work except such of those details of the actual flying that were beyond
the ability of his employer, but rather, Kelly went when, where, and by
that route and carried those people and that baggage as his employer told
him to do; (c) while Kelly was not carried on the pay roll of the Texas
Worth Tool Company, still that company was knowingly and intentionally
paying his hire of $10 a day under the head of expenses of General Mana-
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ger Mennis on company business; (d) to employ a driver for a vehicle
to carry those representing the company in order that they may confer
with salesmen regarding the company's business is within the usual course
of that business. (2) Error, if any, in determining wages received by de-
ceased employee was harmless, where the evidence showed that 60% of
the minimum weekly wage exceeded the maximum weekly compensation.
(3) In a compensation case, a statement by plaintiff's counsel relating to
objections to testimony was not so prejudicial as to require mistrial. (4)
In a compensation case, argument of plaintiff's counsel relating to the busi-
ness of writing insurance for employers was not so prejudicial as to re-
quire discharge of jury. The judgment of the lower court was therefore
affirmed. Texas Employers' Insurance Association v. Kelly, et al., 56 S. W.
Rep. (2d) 1108 (1932), rehearing denied Nov. 19, 1932.
LORRAINE ARNOLD.
